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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In order to remove a lawsuit filed in state court to a
federal district court under the federal removal statute, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, a defendant must file a notice of
3

removal within thirty days of the date on which the
plaintiff serves “the defendant.” Courts have split in
interpreting this thirty day limitation: the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits have held that the thirty day period ends
thirty days after the first defendant is served (the “firstserved” rule), and the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that each defendant has a thirty day
period to file a notice of removal that ends thirty days
after that defendant is served (the “later-served” rule).
Nicole M. Delalla and NMD Marketing, Inc. appeal in
part from the District Court‟s order denying a motion to
remand on the basis that removal was proper under the
later-served rule. Because we conclude that the laterserved rule represents the most faithful and equitable
reading of the removal statute, we will affirm the District
Court‟s order.
I
In 2004, Delalla and NMD were sued by Product
Partners, LLC in a trademark dispute over a line of
nutritional supplements sold under the name “Slim 90.”
See Product Partners, LLC v. NMD Marketing Inc., No.
04-CV-1775 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 23, 2004). At the time,
NMD held a liability insurance policy issued by Hanover
Insurance. Hanover retained Joseph Oberlies of Connor
Weber & Oberlies to represent both Delalla and NMD.
Oberlies negotiated a settlement under which Delalla and
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NMD agreed to discontinue the sales and marketing of
products under the “Slim 90” name.
Although Delalla and NMD complied with the
terms of the settlement, they did not feel that the
negotiated settlement was truly in their interest. Delalla
and NMD privately retained counsel and requested that
Oberlies explain why the settlement was in their interests.
Unsatisfied with Oberlies‟ response, on March 30,
2009 Delalla and NMD filed suit against Hanover,
Oberlies, and Connor Weber & Oberlies in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Camden County, alleging legal
malpractice and other related claims under New Jersey
law. On April 14, 2009, Delalla and NMD served
Hanover with the Complaint. Oberlies and his law firm
(collectively, the “Law Firm Defendants”), however,
were not served until April 23, 2009.
On May 15, 2009, more than thirty days after
Hanover was served but less than thirty days after the
Law Firm Defendants were served, the Law Firm
Defendants filed a notice of removal. Although Hanover
had not filed a notice of removal within thirty days of
being served, it joined in the Law Firm Defendants‟
notice of removal. The case was removed to the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and
was assigned to Judge Robert B. Kugler.
5

On May 22, 2009, Delalla and NMD filed a
motion to remand the action to New Jersey state court on
the basis that the notice of removal was not timely,
having been filed more than thirty days after Hanover
was served. On October 16, 2009, Judge Kugler denied
the motion to remand, finding that the removal was
timely under the later-served rule.
On February 24, 2010, Judge Kugler granted the
Law Firm Defendants‟ motion to transfer the case to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Michael
M. Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
On May 24, 2010, Judge Baylson held oral
argument on various dispositive motions that had been
filed while the case was pending in the District of New
Jersey. On May 26, 2010, Judge Baylson denied the
motions without prejudice, and ordered Delalla and
NMD to file within thirty days an Amended Complaint
that satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
Delalla and NMD did not comply with Judge Baylson‟s
order; instead, on July 2, 2010, they moved for Judge
Baylson to recuse himself from the case.
On August 17, 2010, Judge Baylson denied the
motion for recusal, and ordered that Delalla and NMD
show cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to comply with Rule 9(b). Delalla and NMD
6

responded, but on September 23, 2010, Judge Baylson
dismissed the case with prejudice. On September 28,
2010, Delalla and NMD filed a timely notice of appeal
from Judge Baylson‟s September 23, 2010 Order “and
from all previous orders in the case.” On February 28,
2011, along with their brief, Delalla and NMD filed a
separate petition for mandamus relating to Judge
Kugler‟s February 24, 2010 Order transferring the case.
II
The District Courts had removal jurisdiction over

this action based on diversity of citizenship under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a).1 Delalla and NMD appeal in
part from Judge Kugler‟s October 16, 2009 Order
denying their motion to remand.2 Delalla and NMD urge
1

Although Delalla and NMD take issue with whether
removal was timely, the timeliness of a notice of removal
does not affect whether removal jurisdiction exists under 28
U.S.C. § 1441. See Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 114
(3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he failure to file a removal petition within
the 30 day statutory time limit [does not] affect this Court‟s
jurisdiction.” (quoting McGlinchey v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 866 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 1989))).
2
Delalla and NMD also appeal: (1) Judge Kugler‟s February
24, 2010 Order transferring the case; (2) Judge Baylson‟s
August 17, 2010 Order denying Delalla and NMD‟s motion
for recusal; and (3) Judge Baylson‟s September 23, 2010
Order dismissing the case.
7

An order transferring venue is not appealable until
final judgment is entered, unless either the district court
certifies an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), or the party
seeking to challenge the order files a petition for mandamus.
See Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 765-66 (3d Cir.
1984). Final judgment was entered on September 23, 2010,
when Judge Baylson dismissed Delalla and NMD‟s
complaint. Curiously, rather than immediately appealing
from that final judgment, Delalla and NMD have filed a
petition for mandamus along with this appeal. See In re
Nicole M. Delalla, No. 11-1532 (3d Cir. filed Mar. 3, 2011).
We have jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to the All
Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
Mandamus petitions are subject to a stringent standard
of review—in order to grant mandamus relief, “an appellate
court must find a clear legal error calling for relief that can be
obtained through no other means.” Gold v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added). When Delalla and NMD filed their notice of appeal,
final judgment had already been entered. They could and
should have appealed the transfer order as part of their appeal.
See Nascone, 735 F.2d at 766 (“[I]f the plaintiff ultimately
could appeal from an adverse final judgment in the case, we
believe the plaintiff could then raise the failure of the district
court to re-transfer as grounds for reversal.”). Because
Delalla and NMD could have obtained relief through
alternative means, mandamus relief is not warranted. Id.
Even if final judgment had not been entered, nothing in the
record suggests that Judge Kugler erred in transferring the
case and Delalla and NMD‟s petition would fail on the merits.
8

us to reverse Judge Kugler‟s order denying their motion
to remand, arguing that the Law Firm Defendants‟ notice
of removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). We
have final order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because this appeal requires us to interpret § 1446(b), we
exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s order.
See Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, LLC, 432 F.3d
482, 486 (3d Cir. 2005) (exercising plenary review over
questions of statutory interpretation).
To resolve this appeal, we must weigh in on a
question that has become the subject of a deep circuit
split: “Does the first-served defendant‟s thirty-day clock
run for all subsequently served defendants (the firstserved rule), or does each defendant get his own thirty
days to remove after being served (the later-served
We similarly conclude that Judge Baylson did not
abuse his discretion by denying the motion to recuse.
Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987).
Nothing in the record, when considered objectively,
“display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible.” In re Westinghouse Secs.
Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 720 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States
v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Finally, we agree that Delalla and NMD‟s Complaint
fails to satisfy Rule 9(b), for substantially the same reasons
set forth in Judge Baylson‟s August 17, 2010 Memorandum.
Mem., Aug. 17, 2010, ECF No. 19.
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rule)?” Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir.
2011).
We have yet to address this issue in a
precedential opinion. For the reasons that follow, we join
the majority of circuits and adopt the later-served rule.
A
“Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994).
“Within constitutional bounds,
Congress decides what cases the federal courts have
jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides
whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also
determine when, and under what conditions, federal
courts can hear them.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
212-13 (2007).
By statute, “any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). The procedure for removal is set out in 28
U.S.C. § 1446. Section 1446(a) provides that any
defendant wishing to remove a case must file a notice of
removal in federal court:
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A defendant or defendants desiring to
remove any civil action or criminal
prosecution from a State court shall file in
the district court of the United States for the
district and division within which such
action is pending a notice of removal . . .
containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal, together with a copy of
all process, pleadings, and orders served
upon such defendant or defendants in such
action.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Section 1446(b) then sets out the
rules governing each notice of removal, including the
thirty day limitation at issue here:
The notice of removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be filed within thirty days
after the receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is
based, or within thirty days after the service
of summons upon the defendant if such
initial pleading has then been filed in court
and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
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In construing the thirty day limitation, the majority
of courts of appeals have adopted what has been called
the later-served defendant rule—the rule applied by the
District Court.
Under the later-served rule, each
defendant individually has thirty days to file a notice of
removal beginning when that particular defendant is
served. See Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956 (9th Cir. 2011);
Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202,
1209 (11th Cir. 2008); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca
Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001); Brierly v.
Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 1999).
On the other side of the split are the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits, which have adopted variations of what has
been called the first-served defendant rule. Under the
first-served rule, in order to successfully remove a state
court case, any defendant that seeks to file a notice of
removal must do so within thirty days of the date of
service for the first-served defendant.3 See Barbour v.

3

The Fourth Circuit distinguishes its rule from the Fifth
Circuit‟s rule, calling its approach the “McKinney
Intermediate Rule.” Barbour, 640 F.3d at 607. Both Circuits,
however, agree that no defendant may file a notice of removal
more than thirty days after the first defendant is served. The
distinction between the two rules concerns whether the same
thirty day window applies to later-served defendants who
12

Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 610 (4th Cir. 2011); Getty Oil
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (5th
Cir. 1988).
We agree with the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits that the later-served rule represents the
best reading of § 1446(b) “for reasons grounded in
statutory construction, equity and common sense.”
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956.
B
“When interpreting a statute . . . we must turn first
to the language of the statute itself. When the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the
last: judicial inquiry is complete.” SimmsParris v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., -- F.3d --, No. 09-4542, 2011
WL 3196079, at *3 (3d Cir. July 28, 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
Section 1446(a) provides that “[a] defendant or
defendants” may initiate the removal process by filing a
notice of removal. By referring to “defendants” in the
plural, this subsection explicitly anticipates the
possibility that multiple defendants will file notices of
removal. Section 1446(b) then sets out the rules
wish to join in another defendant‟s timely notice of
removal—a distinction not relevant to this appeal.
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governing each notice of removal that may eventually be
filed, providing that “[t]he notice of removal of a civil
action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after
the receipt by the defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
Section 1446(a) sets out the general rule that
defendants in a civil action must file a notice of removal
in order to initiate the removal process. Section 1446(b)
then sets out a specific rule governing the timeliness of
each notice of removal that is eventually filed. See
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955; Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207;
Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533; see also Barbour, 640 F.3d at
622 (Agee, J., concurring in judgment). This reading
follows from the text of the two provisions, which must
be read together in order to give effect to congressional
intent regarding the procedure for removal. Kokoszka v.
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (statutes should be
read as a whole in order to properly construe
congressional intent).
Subsection (a) uses the phrase “defendant or
defendants” to indicate that one or more defendants may
attempt to remove a case by filing a notice of removal.
Subsection (b) then uses the singular to refer to “[t]he
notice of removal” and “the defendant [who has been
served].” Given that § 1446(a) explicitly affirms the
possibility of multiple notices of removal, the only
reasonable reading of § 1446(b) is that the subsection
applies individually to each notice of removal that might
14

potentially be filed by each removing “defendant.” To
hold otherwise would create tension between subsections
(a) and (b). The plain text of § 1446(b) thus points
toward the later-served rule.
Textual reasons alone support the adoption of the
later-served rule. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that the
rule is also more equitable than the first-served rule.
Under the later-served rule, each defendant has an equal
amount of time in which to decide whether or not to file a
notice of removal. As a result, a defendant‟s right to
removal is protected without regard to when that
defendant was served. Under the first-served rule, on the
other hand, the time a defendant has to file a notice of
removal is a function of when that defendant is served.
Consequently, a later-served defendant may be denied his
or her right to file a notice of removal and to convince his
or her more reluctant co-defendants to join in removal
merely because the removing defendant was not served
earlier. In fact, under the first-served rule, the possibility
exists that a later-served defendant would have had to file
a notice of removal before being served with a complaint.
Such a result contravenes Congress‟s “intent to eliminate
the situation wherein a defendant who has not received
the complaint must decide whether to remove „before he
knows what the suit is about.‟” Sikirica v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
15

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526
U.S. 344, 352 (1999)).
The first-served rule not only unfairly prejudices
later-served defendants, but it creates a perverse
incentive system that encourages further inequity. Under
the first-served rule, a plaintiff who wishes to remain in
state court benefits by serving a defendant who is
indifferent to removal, and then waiting to serve other
defendants who are more likely to wish to remove. The
rule thus incentivizes plaintiffs to take advantage of the
inequities inherent under the first-served rule. By
protecting each defendant‟s right to removal without
regard to whether other defendants were served earlier,
the later-served rule thus removes the incentive for
“unfair manipulation by delaying service on defendants
most likely to remove.” Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955.
C
Courts that have adopted the first-served rule offer
three reasons for their decisions: (1) the first-served rule
derives from a better reading of the language of §
1446(b); (2) the later-served rule is inequitable because it
allows earlier-served defendants two opportunities to
remove; and (3) the first-served rule is more appropriate
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given that removal statutes are to be strictly construed.4
None of these arguments upends the textual basis for the
later-served rule, nor its equitable justifications.
Courts of appeals adhering to the first-served rule
proffer a different reading of § 1446(b), noting that the
thirty day window only applies to the first-served
defendant because the statute uses the singular when
referring to “the defendant.” See, e.g., Barbour, 640 F.3d
at 611. The use of the singular, these courts argue,
suggests that Congress intended that the thirty day period
run only once, rather than for each removing defendant.
When considering the plain meaning of a statute,
however, a court should “not look merely to a particular
clause in which general words may be used, but will take
in connection with it the whole statute . . . and give to it
4

One court has also suggested that the later-served rule is
unfair to plaintiffs because it exposes them to the possibility
that at some point later in the litigation, they may have to
move to federal court. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478,
482 (5th Cir. 1986). As has been pointed out, any such
unfairness would be the product of a plaintiff‟s decision to
delay service upon a defendant after serving the first-served
defendant. Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956. Even if the delay could
not be fairly attributed to the plaintiff, “the marginal
efficiency benefits of selecting a forum early don‟t outweigh
the manifest unfairness of depriving later-served defendants
of a federal forum.” Id.
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such a construction as will carry into execution the will
of the Legislature.” Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 650 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne,
60 U.S. 183, 194 (1856)). It is certainly true that
subsection (b) uses the singular in referring to “the
defendant.” Subsection (b) also uses the singular in the
same clause when discussing “the notice of removal.” If
the use of the singular with respect to “the defendant”
required that thirty day period only applied to one
singular defendant, the use of the singular with respect to
“the notice of removal” should similarly require that only
one notice of removal be permissible. As already
discussed, however, such a reading would conflict with §
1446(a), which explicitly anticipates the possibility of
multiple notices of removal.
In fact, as other courts have recognized, the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits‟ textual reading contravenes the actual
language of § 1446(b) by substituting “the defendant”
with “the initial defendant.” Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955;
Barbour, 640 F.3d at 622-23 (Agee, J., concurring in
judgment). Moreover, if Congress had intended to create
a first-served rule, it could easily have stated as much in
§ 1446(b). It did not. By reading the text to support the
first-served rule, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have failed
to read § 1446(b) alongside § 1446(a) in order to
properly construe the congressional intent behind the
statute as a whole. The later-served rule thus arises out
18

of the most sensible reading of the plain language of §
1446.
In addition to this textual argument, first-served
circuits have also argued that the later-served rule is
inappropriate because it allows earlier-served defendants
two opportunities to exercise their right to removal.
Once thirty days have passed after the first defendant is
served, these circuits argue, the first-served defendant has
chosen not to exercise its right to removal. Removal
requires unanimity—all defendants must join in a notice
of removal in order for removal to be permissible. See
Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U.S. 408, 410 (1886) (“There
can be no removal by the defendants unless they all join
. . . .”). Because the first-served defendant, at the close
of the initial thirty day period, has chosen to not exercise
his or her right to removal, there can no longer be
unanimity. The last-served rule, first-served Circuits
argue, accommodates the rule of unanimity by allowing
earlier-served defendants to “change their minds” and
choose to join in a notice of removal even after initially
deciding against removal. The later-served rule thus
supposedly allows earlier-served defendants two bites at
the removal apple.
As other courts have pointed out, this argument
equates filing a notice of removal with choosing not to
join in a co-defendant‟s notice of removal. As the Ninth
19

Circuit has recognized, however, the two actions are
quite different:
[T]he fact that a defendant hasn‟t taken the
initiative to seek removal doesn‟t
necessarily mean he will object when
another defendant does. Failure to file a
petition may be based on a lack of resources,
trusting a lawyer‟s advice or inertia. There
is no reason to lock an earlier-served
defendant out of the federal forum, if he
later chooses to consent.
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956; see also Barbour, 640 F.3d at
624 (Agee, J., concurring in judgment) (“[F]iling a notice
of removal is not the same as joining in that removal.”
(emphasis in original)).
We agree with the Ninth Circuit. Section 1446(b)
plainly speaks to the requirements for filing a notice of
removal; it does not speak to joinder in another
defendant‟s notice of removal. See Barbour, 640 F.3d at
622-24 (Agee, J., concurring in judgment) (“Section
1446(b) does not speak to multiple defendants, nor does
it reference joinder. Consequently, . . . [r]emoval is
controlled by § 1446(b)‟s thirty-day requirement, but
joinder is not.”). That a defendant has chosen not to file
a notice does not mean that the defendant has chosen to
not join in another notice of removal. An earlier-served
20

defendant should not be precluded from joining in
another defendant‟s notice simply because that defendant
elected not to file a notice of removal. Neither the rule of
unanimity nor § 1446(b) requires a different result.
Finally, courts that have adopted the first-served
rule consistently cite to the general rule that statutory
procedures for removal are to be strictly construed. See,
e.g., Barbour, 640 F.3d at 605 (citing Shamrock Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).
Because the first-served rule represents the strictest
reading of § 1446(b), these courts argue, it is the more
appropriate approach. While it is certainly true that
removal statutes generally should be construed strictly,
the Supreme Court has declined to adopt the strictest
construction of a removal statute where the language of
the statute and congressional intent point toward a more
lenient interpretation. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). In
Murphy Bros., when presented with three alternative
interpretations of the thirty-day window in § 1446(b), the
Supreme Court chose a lenient reading of the statute
based on its assessment of congressional intent. See
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956. In the wake of Murphy Bros.,
the general rule that removal statutes are to be construed
strictly is not sufficient to displace the plain meaning of §
1446(b), not to mention the fairness concerns that weigh
in favor of the later-served rule. See Destfino, 630 F.3d
21

at 956; Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207; cf. Sikirica, 416 F.3d at
222 (noting that this court‟s § 1446(b) jurisprudence “has
been placed in doubt by Murphy Bros.”).
IV
We conclude that the later-served rule represents a
better reading of the language § 1446(b) and results in
more equitable treatment to later-served defendants. We
join the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in
adopting the later-served rule. We will therefore affirm the
District Court‟s order.
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